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Standfirst: the fact that some doctors still believe that antibiotic prophylaxis 
against infective endocarditis is the best clinical option indicates that the no-
lose philosophy is still present in the era of evidence-cased medicine. Just as 
Pascal’s Wager is flawed, so is the no-lose/safety first philosophy, and 
patients may be at risk because of this. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Doctors and dentists have traditionally used antibiotic prophylaxis in certain 
patient groups in order to prevent infective endocarditis (IE). New guidelines, 
however, suggest that the risk to patients from using antibiotics is higher than 
the risk from IE. This paper analyses the relative risks of prescribing and not 
prescribing antibiotic prophylaxis against the background of Pascal’s Wager, 
the infamous assertion that it is better to believe in God regardless of 
evidence, because of the prospective benefits should He exist. Many doctors 
seem to believe the parallel proposition that it is better to prescribe antibiotics, 
regardless of evidence, because of the prospective benefit conferred upon the 
patient. This has been called the “no lose philosophy” in medicine: better safe 
than sorry, even if the evidence inconveniently suggests that following this 
mantra is potentially more likely to result in sorry than safe. It transpires that, 
just as Pascal’s Wager fails to convince because of a lack of evidence to 
support it and the costs incurred by trying to believe, so the “belts and braces” 
approach of prescribing antibiotic prophylaxis is unjustifiable given the actual 
evidence of potential risk and benefit to the patient. Ultimately, there is no no-
lose if your clinical decisions, like Pascal’s Wager, are based on faith rather 
than evidence. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Blaise Pascal embarrassed many contemporary theologians when he made 
his famous Wager, which appeals to prudential gambling rather than faith:  
 
Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved in calling heads that God exists. 
Let us assess the two cases: if you win you win everything. If you lose you lose 
nothing. Do not hesitate then; wager that he does exist. [1] 
 
In other words, it is better to assume that God exists and live your life 
accordingly in order to achieve the infinite payoff of eternal bliss in 
heaven; if He turns out not to exist, you have at worst a small loss. This 
decision matrix can be represented by a table: 
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 God exists God doesn’t 
exist 
You believe in 
God 
Infinite benefit No loss 
You don’t 
believe 
Infinite loss No loss 
Table 1: Pascal’s wager 
 
Pascal’s Wager is widely seen as being a first in terms of theology and 
decision theory, but its relevance to modern medicine has been 
neglected. Thirty years ago, former Scottish Minister and neurosurgeon 
Sam Galbraith compared the Wager to the “no lose” philosophy in 
medicine, defining the latter as taking a clinical decision “to do one thing 
or another without being quite sure of the outcome of either action”.[2] 
Galbraith worked through the example of investigating patients to gather 
as much information as possible before coming to a diagnosis and 
highlighted this precautionary approach ignores the potential morbidity 
and mortality from unnecessary diagnostic procedures. Like Pascal’s 
Wager, the no-lose philosophy in medicine advocates “playing it safe”; 
the difference, of course, is that no harm is done if you accept Pascal’s 
Wager and God doesn’t exist: if you make the wrong clinical decision, 
however, it can have devastating consequences for patients.  
 
One might hope that in the 21st-century era of evidence-based medicine 
the idea of doing unjustified tests and treating patients unnecessarily 
might be ridiculous; however, it appears that Pascal-like thinking is still 
evident in many areas of medicine. This paper looks at the example of 
the prescription of antibiotics to avoid IE in patients undergoing dental 
procedures. 
 
 
Antibiotic Prophylaxis for Infective Endocarditis 
 
Registered dentists are legally entitled to prescribe from the entirety of the 
‘British National Formulary‘ (BNF) and ‘BNF for Children’ (BNFC).[3,4] 
However, dental prescribing within the National Health Service (NHS) is 
restricted to those drugs contained within the ‘List of Dental Preparations’ in 
the ‘Dental Practitioners Formulary‘ (DPF).[5] Until recently, the DPF was a 
distinct publication, providing information on prescribing for general dental 
practitioners. However, it has now been withdrawn and advice on dental 
prescribing has been incorporated into the body of the BNF and BNFC, 
making this advice available to both medical and dental practitioners.  
 
To facilitate easy access to information that is most relevant to primary 
care dental practice, the Scottish Dental Clinical Effectiveness 
Programme (SDCEP) recently published guidance entitled ‘Drug 
Prescribing for Dentistry’, which brings together advice on dental 
prescribing from the BNF and BNFC and presents it in a problem-
orientated style.[6] This advice is based on information provided in the 
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most recent BNF and BNFC, and guidance published by the 
Resuscitation Council (UK). This guidance has led to considerable 
debate around the issue of prescribing antibiotic prophylaxis against IE 
for people undergoing dental procedures. 
 
In the past someone with a prosthetic heart valve, septal defect or other 
specified condition would have been prescribed antibiotics to take one 
hour prior to certain dental procedures. However, the National Institute 
for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) has recently produced 
guidance recommending that antibiotic prophylaxis is not used in 
patients undergoing dental procedures: “Antibiotic prophylaxis against 
infective endocarditis is not recommended for people undergoing dental 
procedures.”[7] This updated advice is now reflected in the latest volume 
of the BNF and SCDEP guidance [3,6]. 
 
On one hand the dental profession is firmly behind the recommendation 
that antibiotic prophylaxis against IE is not recommended for people 
undergoing dental procedures. In contrast, some cardiologists disagree 
with the revised guidance, with the following quote summing up the 
attitudes of many: “Overall, the benefits of prophylaxis [for dental 
procedures] are likely to be considerable in high risk patients (prosthetic 
valves, previous IE, congenital cyanotic heart disease) and relatively 
small in low risk groups such as patients with mitral valve prolapse.” [8] 
This is despite NICE’s conclusion that “There is insufficient evidence to 
determine whether or not antibiotic prophylaxis in those at risk of 
developing infective endocarditis reduces the incidence of IE when given 
before a defined interventional procedure (both dental and non-
dental)”.[7]  
 
So who is right? It appears that the cardiologists are holding to the “no-lose” 
philosophy: even if prophylaxis isn’t routinely necessary, it’s worth doing it 
given the negative consequences if infection were to occur. It’s better for the 
patient to take antibiotics just as it is better to (try to) believe in God according 
to Pascal; even if the probability of endocarditis is small (and even if the 
probability of God existing is small) it’s better to take antibiotics (or believe) 
given the potential downside if it should occur in the absence of antibiotics (or 
if He exists but you didn’t believe). This cardiologist’s wager can be 
represented in a similar form to Pascal’s: 
 
 No IE IE develops 
Provide prophylaxis Benefit No loss  
Don’t provide 
prophylaxis 
 No loss  Harm 
Table 2: the Cardiologist’s Wager. IE = infective endocarditis 
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Note that NICE’s claim is not that prophylaxis does not work, but simply that 
there is insufficient evidence either way (as supporters of Pascal’s Wager 
might also argue). Those who adhere to the no-lose philosophy argue that 
this means we should go for a “better safe than sorry” approach and provide 
the added protection of antibiotic cover. The problem with this approach is 
that we don’t have enough evidence to support the claim that prophylaxis is 
safer rather than sorrier: the converse might well be true, just as it might be 
true that God doesn’t exist.  
 
To take one example of the cardiologist’s wager in action, here is a quote 
from an editorial by T Cheng in the International Journal of Cardiology: 
 
Until the dust settles, it seems to be prudent to continue endocarditis prophylaxis 
for patients with MVP…As the Yellow Emperor of China said, it is far better and 
easier to prevent than to treat a disease. The benefits of chemoprophylaxis far 
outweigh the disadvantages. The benefits are: (1) it is efficacious; (2) it is cost-
effective; and (3) it is simple to do. The only possible disadvantage of 
chemoprophylaxis is risk of adverse reactions such as fatal anaphylaxis. [9] 
 
Just as Pascal said it is prudent to believe in God, so Cheng believes it 
is prudent to prescribe prophylaxis, but one can easily rebut all his 
points. It is obviously better to prevent than to treat a disease, but we 
don’t have any evidence that prophylaxis prevents IE, so this aphorism is 
worthless. We don’t know that it prophylaxis is efficacious, and thus can’t 
say whether it is cost-effective: all Cheng is left with is that it is simple to 
do. He is also quite wrong to state the “only possible disadvantage” is 
adverse reactions: another major risk is the development of antibiotic 
resistance (see below). Cheng is ignoring the wider population picture in 
favour of what (he thinks is) best for the individual, which is perhaps 
understandable for clinicians who are used to seeing single patients 
rather than thinking in global terms. Evidence is derived from 
populations, not individual patients, and there are no anecdotes about 
populations. Ethical public health policy requires a shift from the 
individual to the population approach. Furthermore, case reports are a 
much weaker class of evidence than systematic reviews;[10] just as 
some cardiologists may neglect the bigger picture by focussing on the 
individual patient, so their expert evidence neglects the population 
approach by focussing on anecdotal cases. 
 
Furthermore, it is somewhat ironic that Cheng states that the benefits of 
prophylaxis “far outweigh” the risks given that he approvingly quotes in 
the same article that there is an “absence of data documenting that 
antibiotic prophylaxis prevents endocarditis as a result of procedure-
induced bacteremia; however, it could not exclude that a small number 
of IE cases could be prevented by antibiotic prophylaxis.”[9] These are 
extremely tenuous grounds for administering prophylaxis, and there is 
another parallel with Pascal here. The argument is that, although we 
have no evidence supporting prophylaxis, we can’t rule out the 
possibility, so we should use it. Equally, we have no evidence for the 
existence of God, but that obviously doesn’t rule out his existence, so we 
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should obviously believe in Him. If theologians were embarrassed by 
Pascal’s logic, shouldn’t doctors be embarrassed by this example of the 
no-lose philosophy? 
 
From the patient’s point of view, the choice is between taking some 
drugs and potentially decreasing the risk of endocarditis, and not taking 
them and running the risk. Given that the worst outcome for the patient is 
death (Pascal’s equivalent would be going to Hell instead of Heaven – or 
at best, oblivion) it is understandable that the patient might want to take 
the antibiotics despite the evidence. But given NICE’s verdict that there 
isn’t enough evidence to say whether prophylaxis reduces incidence of 
IE, we could frame the Wager differently here: if we have no evidence for 
the efficacy of prophylaxis (God’s existence), should we not simply avoid 
administering prophylaxis (believing in Him) given the possible 
downsides in terms of anaphylaxis, which causes the deaths of 20 
people for every million treated with antiobiotics. [11]  
 
There is also an additional dimension at play here that complicates matters 
further: if prophylaxis is overused, it increases the risk of antibiotic resistance 
developing, with the potential future effect that prophylaxis becomes 
impossible even for those who really do need it. (The Pascal equivalent would 
be that so many people believed in God that he ceased to exist!) This might 
seem like an over-pessimistic concern, but this is not so: 
 
 The impact of the loss of antibiotics as effective agents in the treatment of 
human infection cannot be over-emphasised and this truly represents a potential 
medical disaster….There is now clear evidence linking the dental prescribing of 
these antimicrobial agents to the emergence of penicillin resistance in the 
community…at least one patient a month dies in the United Kingdom due to 
unsuccessful management of acute dental infection. [12] 
 
NICE’s guidelines are clear, but should dentists and doctors perhaps 
give patients the choice, stating clearly the relative risks of IE and 
antibiotics?  Of course, a problem with this is that patients don’t tend to 
care about resistance. But even if it would be inappropriate (on grounds 
of fighting resistance) to present each individual patient with the choice 
of whether to receive prophylaxis, asking what the typical patient would 
say when faced with the basic available evidence has two advantages: it 
cuts through the different prejudices of widely varied specialities, and it is 
more likely to produce a solution that respects patients’ autonomy. If 
patients are told that the risk of (potentially survivable) IE is normally less 
than 10 in 100,000,[13] but they have a 2 in 100,000 risk of death if they 
receive antibiotic prophylaxis,[11] it seems likely that many will opt not to 
receive cover – even if they were not informed of the lack of evidence of 
efficacy and the potential development of resitance. Furthermore, there 
is some evidence that daily toothbrushing poses a greater risk of IE than 
dental surgery: 
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Routine daily oral activities (e.g. tooth brushing and chewing) cause transient 
streptococcal bacteraemia, the cumulative result of which is an annual 
bacteraemic exposure thousands to millions of times greater than that caused by 
a single tooth extraction. Moreover, a direct link between routine dental 
procedures and IE has never been proven. [14] 
 
Those who support prophylaxis for dental treatment would do well to ask 
themselves whether they would also recommend prophylaxis before 
daily and nightly toothbrushing. If we put all of this data into a patient 
information sheet, the actual decision matrix for the patient would look 
something like this: 
 
 Lucky Unlucky 
Receive 
prophylaxis 
No harm Anaphylaxis or IE 
(or both) 
Don’t receive 
prophylaxis 
No harm  IE 
 Table 3: the Patient’s Wager. IE=infective endocarditis 
(‘lucky’ and ‘unlucky’ represent the patient’s assessment of probabilities) 
 
Although it is extremely unlikely, the possibility exists that an extremely 
unlucky patient could be given prophylaxis, have an anaphylactic 
reaction, and then go on to develop endocarditis if they are lucky enough 
to survive the reaction. Given this table, it seems likely that most patients 
would opt not to receive prophylaxis (and even those who have received 
antibiotic cover in the past and are not at risk of anaphylaxis might opt 
out.) Of course, patients often have problems interpreting risk, but the 
principle of respect for autonomy requires that we give them the relevant 
information rather than simply ask them to trust our supposedly “safety-
first” approach. To put things in the more patient-friendly incidence 
format, Agha and colleagues found that for every 10 million people with 
cardiac conditions treated with prophylaxis, 119 cases of endocarditis 
would be prevented; but 200 people would die of anaphylaxis.[11] 
Another problem with the no-lose philosophy is that it is inherently 
paternalistic. Imagine a patient’s reaction if he was presented with Table 
3 after having received prophylaxis on the assurance of his cardiologist 
that it was for the best; he could well argue that informed consent had 
not been obtained from him.  
 
  One last problem with prophylaxis is its extreme lack of cost-
effectiveness. Caviness and colleagues calculated that the cost of 
preventing one case of endocarditis could cost as much as $95 million, 
or $13 million per quality-adjusted life year, given the number that would 
have to receive prophylaxis to achieve this one prevention.[15] In 
addition, of course, that is a great deal of antibiotics to prescribe in order 
to help one patient, and it runs the risk of many cases of anaphylaxis. 
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The Pascal parallel here would be forcing one million people to believe 
in God in order to get seven of them into heaven.[15] 
Ultimately, the use of prophylaxis against IE seems to be unjustifiable 
given the available evidence and consideration of the possible risks and 
benefits to individual patients. In fact, given the unproven efficacy of 
prophylaxis and the added risk factor of anaphylaxis, it could well be the 
case that providing prophylaxis increases rather than decreases risk: if 
the NICE guideline is correct, then prescribing prophylaxis adds the risk 
of anaphylaxis while doing nothing to reduce the risk of IE.  When we 
add the complication of increased antibiotic resistance, it becomes 
apparent that the “no-lose” philosophy is neither an ethical approach nor 
a real philosophy.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Pascal’s Wager and the “no-lose” philosophy in medicine have a lot in 
common. Both recommend ignoring the evidence and acting on faith: 
faith that God exists despite the lack of any evidence for this proposition 
and faith that a treatment will be better for the patient despite the lack of 
evidence for this assertion – and often despite evidence to the contrary. 
(Another parallel is that both religion and the no-lose philosophy rely to 
some extent on expert opinion.) In the case of IE, NICE’s guideline 
indicates that prophylaxis is unnecessary for most and probably all 
patients, and also that prescription of prophylaxis increases the risk of 
antibiotic resistance. Nonetheless, many doctors still believe that 
providing prophylaxis is the best option and do so, placing their patients 
and others at risk. The no-lose philosophy is still present in medicine, 
and we wager that it will take some time to lose it. 
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